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ARTICLES
LOST LEGISLATIVE INTENT:
WHAT WILL MONTANANS DO WHEN THE MEANING
ISN'T PLAIN?
Stacey L. Gordon* and Helia Jazayeri**
I. INTRODUCTION
A work of fiction means something different to each reader, because
each individual reader interprets the work based on his or her own life ex-
periences and belief system. The author may have intended some specific
meaning and may have clearly conjured that meaning in his or her own
mind, but that meaning is still only one of an infinite number of meanings.
In fiction, both the author and the reader have the prerogative to craft mean-
ing, and it is the fiction writer's role to use language in a way that allows
readers the freedom to interpret.
Laws are also made up of words and in that sense their drafters are
also writers, but the job of legal drafters is to create only one meaning.
Laws are the "source of rights, duties, and powers"1 that govern how people
behave in a particular society. Therefore, the drafters of laws must be pre-
cise. Legislatures do not have the freedom to play with words and create
infinite possibilities of meaning. Laws would have no effect if each mem-
ber of society were free to interpret them based on his or her own beliefs,
experiences, or whims.
* Stacey Gordon, Associate Law Librarian and Adjunct Associate Professor, The University of
Montana School of Law.
** Helia Jazayeri, J.D. Candidate, Class of 2010, The University of Montana School of Law.
1. Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 220-221 (Harvard U. Press 1990) (quoted
in Black's Law Dictionary 900 (Bryan A. Garner, ed., 8th ed., West 2004)).
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That much is obvious. The problem is the English language. Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes noted:
It is true that in theory any document purporting to be serious and to have
some legal effect has one meaning and no other, because the known object is
to achieve some definite result. It is not true that in practice (and I know no
reason why theory should disagree with the facts) a given word or even a
given collection of words has one meaning and no other. A word generally
has several meanings, even in the dictionary.
2
In opening hearings on the use of legislative history in statutory inter-
pretation before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property,
and the Administration of Justice, Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier stated:
In a perfect world, the legislation we passed would always be clear and unam-
biguous, leaving to the courts the relatively simple task of applying, on a
case-by-case basis, the unobscured will of Congress as embodied in the U.S.
Code. Needless to say, ours is not a perfect world.
3
Justice Frankfurter formulated the problem in this way:
[U]nlike mathematical symbols, the phrasing of a document, especially a
complicated enactment, seldom attains more than approximate precision. If
individual words are inexact symbols, with shifting variables, their configura-
tion can hardly achieve invariant meaning or assured definiteness. Apart
from the ambiguity inherent in its symbols, a statute suffers from dubieties. It
is not an equation or a formula representing a clearly marked process, nor is it
an expression of an individual thought to which is imparted the definiteness a
single author can give. A statute is an instrument of government partaking of
its practical purposes but also of its infirmities and limitations, of its awkward
and groping efforts.
4
In our imperfect legal world, even though legislators intend for their
statutes to be unambiguous, courts are often faced with the task of interpret-
ing ambiguous statutes. This is the role of the courts, and in this role the
courts must often determine the underlying legislative intent.5 But how
does one branch of government determine the intent of another branch of
government?
The legislative process does leave a paper trail that would seem the
best way of determining legislative intent. Theoretically, the legislative his-
tory of a statute contains precisely the intent courts are looking for. How-
ever, two issues cloud the effectiveness of the legislative history as a relia-
ble record of legislative intent. First, the legislative process itself probably
does not leave an unadulterated record. Second, it is unlikely that legisla-
2. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 417 (1898).
3. H.R. Subcomm. on Courts, Intell. Prop. & Admin. of Just. of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (Apr. 19, 1990)
(opening statement of Chairman Kastenmeier).
4. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections of Reading Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 528 (1947)
(quoted in Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction vol. 2A, 6 (7th ed., West 2007).
5. Singer, supra n. 4, at § 45.5.
Vol. 70
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tive history actually reflects the collective intent of the legislature-if a
collective intent even exists.
The use of legislative history to interpret law is therefore controversial.
Justice Scalia, perhaps the most outspoken jurist on the issue, offers a wide-
spread general condemnation of the use of legislative history. 6 The U.S.
Supreme Court has gone through periods in which it rarely used-or even
commented on the use of-legislative history. There have been times in
which it used legislative history fairly liberally, and times when it has been
more reserved in relying on legislative history. The Montana Supreme
Court has more definitively articulated a rule regarding the use of legisla-
tive history, but sometimes still veers away from its own holdings.
Given the arguments on both sides of the legislative history debate,
courts may justifiably choose to limit the use of legislative history. Never-
theless, legislative history is a source of legal interpretation that legislatures
must preserve. This article will first discuss what legislative history is and
how both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Montana Supreme Court use
legislative history in statutory interpretation. Then, in Part IV, this article
will focus on why the Montana Legislature should ensure comprehensive
access to legislative history. Finally, Part V will discuss the current barriers
to accessing Montana legislative history and offer suggestions for a more
reliable and accessible legislative record.
II. DEFINING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
It is important to distinguish between legislative history and legislative
intent. Black's Law Dictionary defines legislative intent as "[t]he design or
plan that the legislature had at the time of enacting a statute."' 7 Legislative
intent does not necessarily reveal the meaning of individual words, though
it does provide courts with a means of choosing between competing inter-
pretations. Some schools of legislative interpretation provide that the
court's duty is to discern and uphold the intent of the legislature; others
eschew both the existence of a collective intent and the need to discern such
if it does exist.8 For those in the former school, legislative history is one
way to discover legislative intent.
Black's Law Dictionary defines legislative history as "[t]he back-
ground and events leading to the enactment of a statute, including hearings,
6. Joseph L. Gerken, What Good Is Legislative History? Justice Scalia in the Federal Courts of
Appeals 87 (William S. Hein & Co. 2007). Gerken goes so far as to say that Justice Scalia had made it
clear that legislative history "is of virtually no use" in statutory interpretation. Id. at 86. However,
"virtually" is the key word in that phrase and Gerken later notes that even Scalia recognizes the limited
use of legislative history to avoid absurdities in interpretation. Id. at 110.
7. Black's Law Dictionary, supra n. 1, at 919.
8. See infra Section IV.
2009
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committee reports, and floor debates." The beginning of this definition-
"the background and events"-is actually broader than the common under-
standing of legislative history and, if it were not limited by the remainder of
the definition, would seem to encompass more than the documents created
during the legislative process. Legislative history includes the "documents
[legislatures generate] in the course of enacting statutes."10 The compli-
cated legislative process can be divided into three stages when referring to
"legislative history": pre-enactment history, enactment history, and subse-
quent-enactment history (amendment). 1  Justice Scalia's definition of leg-
islative history refers simply to "the pre-enactment statements of those who
drafted or voted for a law," 12 though likely the phrase "pre-enactment state-
ments" simply distinguishes documents that are part of the legislative re-
cord from those that comment on the legislation after its enactment.'
3
Undoubtedly, the political process generates statements both written
and unwritten that are not part of the official record. Scalia notes that
"[these statements are] considered persuasive by some, not because they
reflect the general understanding of the disputed terms, but because the leg-
islators who heard or read those statements presumably voted with that un-
derstanding."' 14 Though it barely hides his distrust of legislative history,
Justice Scalia's definition also suggests a limitation on the documents that
can be considered part of a bill's legislative history. Only those written
documents that would have been available to the legislative body as a
whole are properly part of the legislative history. A federal legislative his-
tory can contain committee reports, hearing transcripts with both written
and oral testimony, sponsor statements, bill amendments, floor debate
(which is published daily in the Congressional Record), voting records, and
presidential signing statements. For examples of compiled legislative histo-
ries, see those published by William S. Hein & Co.' 5
The amount of legislative history for a Montana bill is significantly
smaller. The Montana legislative process produces written hearing minutes
with the exhibits distributed at the hearing and any written testimony
presented at the hearing. The legislative process also produces hearing tes-
9. Black's Law Dictionarn, supra n. 1, at 919.
10. Gerken, supra n. 6, at 1.
11. Singer, supra n. 4, at § 48.01.
12. D.C. v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2805 (2008).
13. See id. Scalia says later, "[Legislative historyl most certainly does not refer to the examination
of a variety of legal and other sources to determine the public understanding of a legal text in the period
after its enactment or ratification. That sort of inquiry is a critical tool of constitutional interpretation."
Id. (emphasis in original).
14. Id.
15. For example, the Hein legislative history of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconcilia-
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timony in audio format, bill amendments, and voting records. In contrast to
voltminous legislative histories that accompany fcdCral statutes, a Montana
legislative history may only contain a few sheets of paper.
The question is whether legislative history is a reliable source to dis-
cover the will of Congress. Is the political process transparent enough that
the documents it creates truly reveal the intent of the whole'? The U.S.
Supreme Court largely says no, except in certain circumstances. Justice
Scalia takes the extreme position that legislative history cannot reflect the
intent of Congress and thercbre should not be used to determine the correct
interpretation of a statute. Justice Breyer, on the other hand, advocates the
use of legislative history in statutory interpretation.16
I11. THtE USES OF LEGISIATIVI HISTORY
A. How the U.S. Suprene Court Uses Legislative History
In the case oft a statute .. it would be possible to say that as WC are dealintg
with the commands of the sovereign the only thing to do is to find out what
the sovereign wants. It supreme power resided in the person of a despot who
would cut off your hand or your head it' you went wrong. probably one would
take every available means to find out what was wanted.17
This quotation, isolated from its context, appears to support the use of
legislative history. But Holmes is actually arguing the opposing view: in-
terpreting statutes is no different than interpreting contracts or wills.
Holmes advocates interpreting documents according to what a "normal
speaker of English" under the circumstances would understand. I" Three
years after publication of this article, Holmes was appointed to the U.S.
Supreme Court. during an era in which the Court generally subscribed to
the 'plain meaning rule." '
The Court's use of legislative history can be divided into four general
periods.2-t In his exhaustive examination of Justice Scalia's opinions re-
garding the use of legislative history, Joseph Gerken characterized these
periods as: (1) the founding of the Court in 1789 through its decision in
Holy Trinity Church v. United States in 1892, (2) the period between 1892
16. Sce inl)'a Section IV.
17. Holmes. , ou/wa n. 2. at 41t).
18. id.
19. See Gerken, ,uira n. 6. at ch. 3.
20. I There is a significant both of literature about the Cotrt' us o1 0 'I iat ic hitol\. A
comprehensive discussion of how the Court has used and currently uses le~idati\e hittor is \\ell be-
ond the scope of this article. The chapter in Gerken's book is ttftici it fto tie putposcs ot this at title
H owc\er, esearchers who would like to dig deeper into this topic can consult, among other sotrces:
Beth N I. Henschen. Jmticial Use i oi Legitshaive HistorY and Intelt in st, tnut,, lt, , 'rr, i, n,',. 10 I Cels
Stud. Q. 353 (1985): Singer. supa i. 4 . at cli. 48. 48A.
2009
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and 1940 when the Court tended to follow the "plain meaning rule," (3) a
period of more liberal use of legislative history between the early 1940s and
Justice Scalia's appointment in 1986, and (4) the current era in which Jus-
tice Scalia's views have caused the Court to reconsider its use of legislative
history.
21
Holy Trinity Church v. United States22 is commonly regarded as the
case in which the Court defined its willingness to use legislative history as a
tool to interpret statutes. 23 This case marks a significant departure from the
preceding period in which the Court rarely used legislative history, and
when it did, it did so without explanation or with explanations that seemed
contradictory. 24 In one early case, the Court said that "'when any ambigu-
ity exists,' it would be appropriate to look 'to the public history of the times
in which it was passed.'- 25 However, until Holy Trinity, the Court did not
affirmatively state that legislative history was a proper tool for interpreting
statutes.
26
After Holy Trinity, the Court recognized the appropriateness of using
legislative history in limited situations 27 and generally followed the "plain
meaning rule." Under the plain meaning rule, the Court must look first to
the face of the statute. If the meaning is unambiguous, it cannot turn to
legislative history. The one exception is when application of the plain
meaning rule would lead to an absurd result.28
Caminetti v. United States29 is the most commonly cited case for the
application of the plain meaning rule, even though the Court recognized and
used the rule prior to its decision in Caminetti.30 In Caminetti, the Court
applied the rule to reach an extreme result even when use of the legislative
history would have dictated the opposite result. 31 The Caminetti defendants
were charged under the Mann Act 32 for transporting women across state
lines with "an immoral purpose. ' 33 The defendants argued the Mann Act
was intended to prevent transporting women for prostitution, but in each of
21. Gerken, supra n. 6, at 39.
22. Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
23. Gerken, supra n. 6, at 42.
24. Id. at 40-42. Gerken notes two cases in which the Court seemed to espouse opposing princi-
ples: Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9 (1845), in which the Court rejected the use of legislative history for
statutory interpretation; and Dubuque & P. R.R. v. Litchfield, 64 U.S. 66 (1860), in which the Court's
use of legislative history was the determinative factor in its decision. Gerken, supra n. 6, at 40-42.
25. Gerken, supra n. 6, at 41 (quoting Aldridge, 44 U.S. at 24).
26. Id. at 42.
27. Id. at 45.
28. Id.
29. Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
30. Gerken, supra n. 6, at 52.
31. Id. at 54.
32. White Slave Trade Act of 1910, Ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910).
33. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 482-483 (cited in Gerken, supra n. 6, at 54).
Vol. 70
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their cases the women were mistresses and there was no evidence of prosti-
tution.34 Their argument was well-supported by the legislative history, in-
cluding Congressional Representative Mann's own statement that the stat-
ute was "limited to the cases in which there is an act of transportation in
interstate commerce for the purposes of prostitution. ' 35 Nevertheless, the
Court upheld the convictions, rejecting the legislative history argument by
stating that
[it] is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be
sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if
the law is within the constitutional authority of the law-making body which
passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.
Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the
duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful
meanings need no discussion. 3
6
In the years following Caminetti, the Court at various times rejected the use
of legislative history because the meaning of the statute was clear, prefaced
its use of legislative history by first noting that the meaning of the statute
was not plain on its face, or, interestingly, used legislative history to support
the obvious plain meaning.37
Then, with its decision in United States v. American Trucking Associa-
tion,38 the Court espoused a new theory of statutory interpretation in which
it recognized the use of legislative history even though the meaning of the
statute was plain. 39 In American Trucking, the Court stated, "When aid to
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available,
there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear
the words may appear on 'superficial examination.' -40 Under this reason-
ing, the Court could use legislative history whether or not the statute's plain
meaning was ambiguous or would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result.
The Court could also consider legislative history when application of the
plain meaning of the statute was simply contrary to legislative intent.41
The above discussion suggests a more linear development than what
actually occurred. These four periods mark major shifts, but in reality the
Court's use of legislative history was far more nuanced than the above sum-
34. Id. (cited in Gerken, supra n. 6, at 54).
35. Id. at 498 (McKenna, J., dissenting)).
36. Id. at 485 (citing Lake Co. v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670-671 (1889); Bate Refrigerating Co. v.
Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 33 (1894); U.S. v. Lexington Mill and Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409 (1914);
U.S. v. Bank, 234 U.S. 245, 258 (1914)) (quoted in Gerken, supra n. 6, at 55).
37. Gerken, supra n. 6, at 57-59.
38. U.S. v. Am. Trucking Assn., 310 U.S. 534 (1910).
39. Gerken, supra n. 6, at 65.
40. 310 U.S. at 543-544 (citing Bos. Sand & Gravel Co. v. U.S., 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928); Helvering
v. N.Y Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 465 (1934)) (quoted in Gerken, supra n. 6, at 65).
41. Gerken, supra n. 6, at 66.
2009
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mary suggests. For example, Holy Trinity may be characterized as an-
nouncing a "soft plain meaning" rule under which it was the Court's role to
determine congressional intent and the best indicator of intent was the plain
language of the statute itself. But because discovering intent was the under-
lying goal, legislative history could trump plain meaning. 42 The Court re-
jected this approach in Caminetti. However, despite the Court's strict appli-
cation of the plain meaning rule in Caminetti, Yale law professor William
N. Eskridge notes that "[i]n almost all of the leading plain meaning cases of
the Warren and Burger Courts, the Court checked the legislative history to
be certain that its confidence in the clear text did not misread the legisla-
ture's intent." 43 Under Eskridge's analysis, the soft plain meaning rule was
at least in the background of the Court's statutory interpretation jurispru-
dence for over a century.
Justice Scalia's appointment to the Court marked the end of the
Court's more liberal use of legislative history. With the first sentence of his
book about Justice Scalia and legislative history, Gerken succinctly summa-
rizes: "Justice Antonin Scalia hates legislative history." 44 That may not be
quite accurate, but in just one decade the Court went from using legislative
history in virtually every statutory interpretation case in the 1981 session to
using it in approximately 15% of such cases in the 1989 session, which
prompted Justice Breyer to predict that the Court's use of legislative history
to interpret statutes would soon become a rarity.
45
Eskridge characterizes Scalia as a "new textualist" 46 and credits him,
along with Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook, with founding this
school of statutory interpretation that is fairly averse to the use of legislative
history.47 New textualism returns to the strict plain meaning rule, maintain-
ing that legislative history is irrelevant and should not be used even to sup-
port the plain meaning, which can be well supported by the structure of the
statute itself, the interpretation of similar statutes, and traditional canons of
42. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 626 (1989) (reprinted in
Singer, supra n. 4, at vol. 2A, 783-848).
43. Id. at 627.
44. Gerken, supra n. 6, at 1. To be fair, Gerken backs off his statement somewhat, but only
slightly. See id. Scalia's views of legislative history as a statutory interpretation tool cannot be compre-
hensively covered in the scope of this article; they are better the subject of a book. Fritz Snyder notes
that in the years 1986-1996 "well over a hundred law review articles have appeared on this topic." Fritz
Snyder, Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit, 49
Okla. L. Rev. 573, 573 (1996). Gerken's book contains an excellent bibliography for further research
into Scalia's legislative history jurisprudence. See Gerken, supra n. 6, at 337-347.
45. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev.
845, 846 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
46. For an explanation of this terminology, see Eskridge, supra n. 42, at 623 n. 11.
47. Id. at 650.
Vol. 70
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statutory construction. 48 Scalia recognizes that statutory language may be
ambiguous but believes ambiguities can be resolved by a reading of the
statute as a whole. 49
First announced in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Car-
doza-Fonseca,50 Scalia's new textualism rejects the basis of the soft plain
meaning rule. Although he concurred with the result, Scalia refused to join
the majority opinion because he disagreed with the majority's use of legis-
lative history to determine whether Congress expressed an intent that would
contradict the plain language. In his concurring opinion, Scalia said,
"Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions. Where
the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an
unenacted legislative intent."5 1 Furthermore, Scalia generally disapproves
of using the legislative process to determine legislative intent. His distrust
can be summarized in three points: (1) an "intent of the whole" that reflects
the unified intent of every member of Congress does not exist; (2) even if
such intent existed, legislative history is not the proper source to discover
that intent; and (3) legislative history is never enacted into law. 52
The Court may have significantly reigned in its use of legislative his-
tory, but the issue remains controversial, with Justices Breyer and Scalia
supporting opposite ends of the spectrum. Two years before he was ap-
pointed to the Court, while still sitting on the First Circuit Court of Appeals,
Stephen Breyer defended the use of legislative history. 53 He noted that con-
text is often used to determine meaning.54 For example:
The meaning of [a] sign [in a city park], the scope of its rule, depends on
context, on convention, and on purpose. Is this fact not true of words in
statutes as well? Should one not look to the background of a statute, the
terms of the debate over its enactment, the factual assumptions the legislators
made, the conventions they thought applicable, and their expressed objectives
48. Id. at 623-624.
49. Student Author, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 Harv.
L. Rev. 1005, 1005 (1992) [hereinafter Legislative History Today].
50. Immig. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (Scalia, J. concurring)
(cited in Legislative History Today, supra n. 49, at 1005).
51. Id. at 452-453. Scalia criticized the majority not only for its motivation in using legislative
history, but also for its extensive discussion of legislative history. He viewed the majority's discussion
as gratuitous and feared that such a lengthy discussion of legislative history would encourage its further
use. Id. at 453.
52. Gerken, supra n. 6, at 91-97.
53. See Breyer, supra n. 45.
54. Id. at 848. In making this argument, Breyer uses the example of a sign that says, "No animals
in the park." Without knowing the context (i.e. the specific park in which the sign is posted), this sign
would seem to ban all animals from some park. However, once you know the context, that the sign is
posted in Central Park. for example, you realize that the sign is probably intended to keep dogs out of
the park, but does not apply to animals such as squirrels. Id.
2009
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in an effort to understand the statute's relevant context, conventions, and pur-
poses?
55
Breyer offered five situations in which legislative history is helpful in
interpreting statutes. The first three uses he characterized as uncontrover-
sial: (1) avoiding an absurd result (with which even Justice Scalia has
agreed); (2) correcting drafting errors; and (3) illuminating special mean-
ings of certain language (which Justice Scalia also seems to approve of).56
He conceded that these last two uses are more controversial: (1) "identify-
ing a 'reasonable purpose' "; and (2) selecting from multiple reasonable in-
terpretations when the statute is politically controversial. 57 Despite possible
controversy, Breyer demonstrated that using legislative history in these last
two situations at least provides a result that fairly corresponds to the intent
of the legislators. 58 More importantly, Breyer deflates one of Scalia's main
arguments against legislative history (without ever mentioning the argu-
ment) by demonstrating that the legislative process is trustworthy.
59
Despite the sharp decline in the Court's use of legislative history, it
may not be accurate to credit Justice Scalia's criticisms as the sole cause of
that decline. Justice Scalia's criticisms have certainly added to the body of
judicial discussion about the proper role of legislative history, but Gerken
notes that Justice Scalia's criticisms almost always appear in concurring or
dissenting opinions in cases in which the Court has found legislative history
to be a relevant and helpful source of interpretation. 60 For example, in the
dissent in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Justice Scalia bitterly criticized the major-
ity for inappropriately using legislative history, highlighting the majority's
selectivity and the nature of the documents selected, as particularly egre-
gious.6 1 Referring to the majority's use of floor statements, Scalia wrote:
Of course this observation, even if true, makes no difference unless one in-
dulges the fantasy that Senate floor speeches are attended (like the Philippics
of Demosthenes) by throngs of eager listeners, instead of being delivered (like
Demosthenes' practice sessions on the beach) alone into a vast emptiness.
Whether the floor statements are spoken where no Senator hears, or written




56. Id. at 848-853, 861.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 853-861.
59. Breyer, supra n. 45, at 858-860.
60. Gerken, supra n. 6, at 4.
61. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 665-668 (2006) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
62. Id. at 665-666. Curiously, this contention that nobody listens to statements from the floor
undermines Justice Scalia's own argument that the use of these particular floor statements was improper
in part because of their highly political nature.
Vol. 70
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Regardless of these criticisms, the majority used both the floor statements
Justice Scalia complained about and the drafting history of the Detainee
Treatment Act to come to its decision.
63
In District of Columbia v. Heller,64 Scalia himself wrote an opinion
that relied heavily on extrinsic documentary evidence to interpret the origi-
nal meaning of the Second Amendment. 65 However, he could not help but
criticize his colleague, Justice Stevens, for mischaracterizing these docu-
ments as legislative history, stating,
66
"Legislative history," of course, refers to the pre-enactment statements of
those who drafted or voted for a law; it is considered persuasive by some, not
because they reflect the general understanding of the disputed terms, but be-
cause the legislators who heard or read those statements presumably voted
with that understanding. . "Postenactment legislative history," ... a depre-
catory contradiction in terms, refers to statements of those who drafted or
voted for the law that are made after its enactment and hence could have had
no effect on the congressional vote. It most certainly does not refer to the
examination of a variety of legal and other sources to determine the public
understanding of a legal text in the period after its enactment or ratification.
That sort of inquiry is a critical tool of constitutional interpretation.
67
Irrespective of the proper classification of the documents relied on by Jus-
tice Scalia, he was careful to refute the characterization of them as legisla-
tive history, thereby protecting his stance against the use of legislative his-
tory.
B. How the Montana Supreme Court Uses Legislative History
Further, statutory language must be construed according to its plain meaning
and, if the language is clear and unambiguous, no further interpretation is
required ... If the plain words of a statute are ambiguous, however, the next
step in judicial interpretation of the statute is to determine the intent of the
legislature. This is accomplished by examining the legislative history of the
statute, including the title of the original bill.
68
The Montana Supreme Court is under a statutory mandate to determine
legislative intent: "In the construction of a statute, the intention of the legis-
lature is to be pursued if possible." 69 This statute does not require the Court
to turn to legislative history; it merely says that the Court must ascertain
legislative intent, without naming the sources the Court must use to make
63. Id. at 578-580, 580 n. 10.
64. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
65. Id. at 2805-2816.
66. Id. at 2805.
67. Id. (internal citations omitted).
68. Infinity Ins. Co. v. Dodson, 14 P.3d 487, 496 (Mont. 2000) (citing multiple references).
69. Mont. Code Ann. § 1-2-102 (2007).
2009
11
Gordon and Jazayeri: Lost Legislative Intent
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2009
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
that determination. The Court has clearly stated the rule that the first source
of legislative intent is the plain meaning of the statute itself.
70
In its earliest discussions of statutory interpretation, the Montana Su-
preme Court subscribed to the more flexible soft plain meaning rule, recog-
nizing the Court's duty to uncover legislative intent and its power to "recur
to the history of the times when [the statute] was enacted" if necessary to
determine that intent. 71 This language recalls the U.S. Supreme Court's
statement in Aldridge that the Court could appropriately look "to the public
history of the times in which it was passed."
72
Interestingly, this is not really an endorsement of using legislative his-
tory; it is more a recognition of the appropriateness of using extrinsic
sources that can aid in statutory interpretation. In fact, in a case interpreting
a Montana statute that was intended to implement a federal statute, the
Montana Supreme Court looked to the circumstances surrounding the pas-
sage of the federal statute.73 To arrive at an interpretation consistent with
the purpose of the federal statute, the Court was forced to construe the lan-
guage such that "or" meant "and," 74 which might appear to be an overstep-
ping of the role of interpreter by assuming the role of drafter. The Court
did not cite the plain meaning rule but instead asserted:
In construing a statute, the intention of the legislature is the controlling con-
sideration, and, to ascertain the reason and meaning of particular provisions of
doubtful meaning, courts may recur to the history of the times and the cause
or necessity influencing the passage of the act.
75
However, the Court further explained that extraordinary circum-
stances-in this case a special session of the legislature-may require the
use of unusual documents. "[I]n this instance, the language is to be under-
stood in the light of the special message of the [g]overnor submitting the
subject-matter for legislative consideration."7 6 In other cases, the Montana
Supreme Court specifically included legislative history as a proper source
for ascertaining legislative intent. For example, in Nichols v. School Dis-
trict No. 3 of Ravalli County,7 7 the Court noted that it could "avail [itself] of
the actual proceedings of the Legislature in the enactment of laws as dis-
closed by the legislative records." 78 By 1994, this was stated as a rule:
"When analyzing statutory law, courts look first to the plain meaning of the
70. See Infinit ' Ins. Co., 14 P.3d at 496.
71. Sullivan v. Cit' of Butte, 211 P. 301, 302 (Mont. 1922) (citing Lerch v. Missoula Brick & Tile
Co., 123 P. 25, 26 (Mont. 1912)).
72. Aldridge, 44 U.S. at 24.
73. Mont. ex rel. Williams v. Kamp, 78 P.2d 585 (Mont. 1938).
74. Id. at 588.
75. Id. at 586 (citing Lerch, 123 P. at 26).
76. Sullivan, 211 P. at 302 (citing Mont. v. Cloncv, 76 P. 10, 13 (Mont. 1904)).
77. Nichols v. Sch. Dist. No. 3 of Ravalli Co, 287 P. 624 (Mont. 1930).
78. Id. at 626.
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words used in the statute, and if that is unclear, then courts look to legisla-
tive history." 7
9
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the Montana Supreme Court has always
recognized the "absurd result" exception to the plain meaning rule. In Mon-
tana v. Heath,80 the Montana Supreme Court stated, "It has long been a rule
of statutory construction that a literal application of a statute which would
lead to absurd results should be avoided whenever any reasonable explana-
tion can be given consistent with the legislative purpose of the statute."
8 1
In Heath, the Court analyzed several statutory interpretation rules. In
addition to its reliance on the soft plain meaning rule and the absurd-result
exception to the plain meaning rule, the Court also iterated the concept that
statutes must be construed holistically-interpretation must look at the
"'statute's text, language, structure, and object.' "82 Furthermore, the inter-
pretation must give effect to the entire statute.83 Finally, the Court must
select an interpretation that renders the statute constitutional.
84
The statute at issue became ambiguous after an amendment renum-
bered the various sections but did not correct all the internal citations.
85
The Court first turned to the plain meaning of the statute, but quickly found
the plain meaning was ambiguous to the point it could render part of the
statutory scheme meaningless. 86 In trying to untangle the legislature's in-
tent, the Court cited testimony from the House and Senate committee hear-
ings along with the "whereas" clauses in the bill itself, and determined that
the legislature, in enacting the amendment, intended to make no substantive
changes to the former statute. The Court fulfilled its duty to determine the
intent of the legislature, stating, "This Court will not permit legislative in-
tent to be thwarted, and the whole of the judiciary's sentencing authority to
be undermined, by a mere scrivener's error." 87 Nevertheless, despite its
reliance on legislative history, the Court followed the plain meaning rule
and looked first to the plain language of the statute.
In Farmers Alliance Mutual Insurance Company v. Holeman,8 8 both
the majority and the dissent followed the plain meaning rule but with differ-
79. Carbon Co. v. Dain Bosworth, Inc., 874 P.2d 718, 722 (Mont. 1994) (citing Mont. ex rel.
Roberts v. Pub. Serv. Com. of Mont., 790 P.2d 489, 492 (Mont. 1990)).
80. Mont. v. Heath, 90 P.3d 426 (Mont. 2004).
81. Id. at 434 (citing Chain v. Dept. of Motor Vehs., 36 P.3d 358, 361 (Mont. 2001); Darby Spat
Ltd. v. Dept. of Revenue, 705 P.2d 111, 113 (Mont. 1985); Mont. ex rel. Spec. Road Dist. No. 8 v. Mills,
261 P. 885, 889 (Mont. 1927)).
82. Id. at 432 (quoting S.L.H. v. St. Compen. Mut. Ins. Fund, 15 P.3d 948, 952 (Mont. 2000)).
83. Id. at 433 (citing Mont. v. Berger, 856 P.2d 552, 554 (Mont. 1993)).
84. Id. at 435 (quoting Mont. v. Helfrich, 922 P.2d 1159, 1160 (Mont. 1996)).
85. Id. at 430-43 1.
86. Heath, 90 P.3d at 434.
87. Id.
88. Farmers Alliance Mutual Ins. Co. v. Holeman, 924 P.2d 1315 (Mont. 1996).
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ent results.8 9 This would seem to indicate that the plain meaning was am-
biguous after all, but neither the majority nor the dissent turned to legisla-
tive history; both relied on interpreting the words in the statute itself.90 The
majority did note that if its interpretation was an error, at least it was consis-
tent with public policy. 91
Despite its proclaimed adherence to the plain meaning rule (more
properly characterized as the soft plain meaning rule), the Montana Su-
preme Court occasionally deviates from strictly applying the rule. For ex-
ample, in Carbon County v. Dain Bosworth, Inc.,92 the Court restated the
plain meaning rule, 93 but then went on to discuss the legislative history of
the statute without first finding the plain meaning was ambiguous. 94 Curi-
ously, the Court then concluded that "the plain meaning of the Revolving
Fund Law and the legislative history support the legislative intent to allow
counties to choose whether to finance the districts by issuing bonds secured
by the revolving fund."95 The Court confused the rule here by using legis-
lative history to determine a meaning that it then said was plain; however,
by definition "plain meaning" should not require an inquiry into legislative
history.
In Thiel v. Taurus Drilling Ltd. 1980-II,96 the Court considered both
the plain meaning and the legislative history but determined that neither
provided any guidance in determining the legislature's intent. 97 So the
Court turned instead to an article published in the Montana Law Review as
evidence of the "circumstances surrounding the change in the law." 98
Again, this recalls the U.S. Supreme Court's early statements about appro-
priate sources for statutory interpretation.
The Montana Supreme Court continues to be more liberal in its use of
legislative history than the U.S. Supreme Court. So far, there is no move-
ment in Montana to curtail the use of legislative history analogous to Justice
Scalia's "new textualism." In fact, the Montana Supreme Court has never
cited Justice Scalia in its discussions of the use of legislative history. The
Montana Supreme Court has consistently stated, if not always exactly ad-
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1320.
92. Carbon Co. v. Dain Bosworth, Inc., 874 P.2d 718 (Mont. 1994).
93. Id. at 722 (citing Mont. ex rel. Roberts, 790 P.2d at 492; Blake 1'. Mont., 735 P.2d 262, 265
(Mont. 1987)).
94. Id. at 722-723.
95. Id. at 723.
96. Thiel v. Taurus Drilling Ltd. 1980-11, 710 P.2d 33 (Mont. 1985).
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hered to, a version of the plain meaning rule under which legislative history
is an appropriate source of interpretation if the plain meaning is ambiguous.
IV. ACCESS TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN MONTANA
Section III reveals two realities that suggest comprehensive access to
legislative history is crucial to statutory interpretation. First, as can be seen
in the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence, theories of statutory interpreta-
tion and trends in the use of legislative history shift and develop; if legisla-
tive history becomes inaccessible, the practical result will be the end of
inquiry and thought on this subject. Law is dynamic and should not be
hindered by the inaccessibility of research material. Second, even where a
court consistently limits its use of legislative history, it still needs access to
complete legislative history in the instances that legislative history becomes
a necessary tool of interpretation. Even Justice Scalia recognizes at least
one potential use for legislative history: avoidance of an absurd result under
application of the plain meaning of the statute.99 Justice Breyer elaborated
on at least three other instances in which the use of legislative history is not
particularly controversial,100 or at least were uncontroversial at the time he
wrote the article, which was early in Justice Scalia's tenure on the Court.
The Montana Supreme Court's occasional consideration of the public his-
tory underlying a statute strongly justifies maintaining comprehensive ac-
cess to legislative history. History can be gleaned from many sources-
treatises, newspapers, contemporary law review articles-but only legisla-
tive history can reveal the legislature's responses to social forces. Other
sources provide only background, not true legislative context.
Consider the Montana Urban Renewal Act.'01 The minutes of a hear-
ing before the Montana House Committee on Affairs of Cities reveal that
this law was drafted in response to a polio outbreak in Browning, on the
Blackfeet Reservation-hardly an urban area.10 2 The bill was drafted by an
attorney for the Blackfeet Tribe with the intent of receiving funding under
the federal Housing Act to remove a blighted area in Browning in order to
prevent further disease. 10 3 The bill, of course, applied beyond Browning
and authorized municipalities to remove areas that had become blighted.'
0 4
Researching the public history at time of enactment would likely reveal the
99. Gerken, supra n. 6, at 110 (citing Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989);
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (Scalia, J. concurring)).
100. Breyer, supra n. 45.
101. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 7-15-4201 to 7-15-4324 (2007).
102. See, Michelle Bryan Mudd, Was the Big Sky Really Falling? Examining Montana's Response to
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concern about the polio outbreak, but probably would not reveal that the
legislature responded by enacting the Urban Renewal Act. Only the legisla-
tive history makes that connection.
An important and unique consideration favoring access to legislative
history in Montana is the Montana Constitution's strong constitutional
"Right-to-Know" provision:
No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe
the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its
subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy
clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.
10 5
The first clause of this provision seems to require comprehensive access to
legislative documents. Although not in reference to the legislative process,
the Montana Supreme Court has recognized "an 'affirmative' duty on gov-
ernment officials to make all of their records and proceedings available to
public scrutiny."' 1 6 The Court has never applied the Right-to-Know provi-
sion to legislative documents. The case law applying the provision focuses
on two issues: what is a public body (and what is a public writing), and
what is protected from examination by individual privacy considera-
tions? 10 7 The analysis of these questions does not remove legislative docu-
ments and proceedings from the application of Right-to-Know provision. 108
Most compelling is the fact that the Montana statutory definition of "public
documents" includes legislative documents. 10 9 Professor Fritz Snyder
points out that the Montana Supreme Court tends to interpret this definition
liberally. °10 This suggests that Montanans have a constitutional right to
''examine" legislative history.
Two further questions arise in the context of the legislative process:
what is access, and for how long must the legislature provide access? Arti-
cle II, Section 9 grants the public the right to "examine documents" or "ob-
serve deliberations." 1"' This seems to require that legislative history be
publicly accessible. However, the provision is silent on the issue of format.
As the Montana Legislature moves away from paper formats to exclusively
digital formats, including audio, the question arises as to whether those for-
mats provide all Montanans with the necessary public access to "examine
105. Mont. Const. art II, § 9.
106. Great Falls Tribune v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Commn., 82 P.3d 879, 885-886 (Mont. 2003) (cited in
Fritz Snyder, The Right to Participate and the Right to Know in Montana, 66 Mont. L. Rev. 297, 324
(2005) [hereinafter Snyder, The Right to Participate]).
107. Snyder, The Right to Participate, supra n. 106, at 311-327.
108. See id.
109. Mont. Code Ann. § 2-6-101(2)(a) (2007). Many states exclude legislative documents from the
definition of public writings. Carol D. Billings, State Government Efforts to Preserve Electronic Gov-
ernment Information, 96 L. Lib. J. 625, 626 (2004).
110. Snyder, The Right to Participate, supra n. 106, at 324.
111. Mont. Const. art II, § 9.
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documents." Furthermore, unless legislative "documents" in any format are
archived in perpetuity, the Right-to-Know provision is weakened as histori-
cal access is lost. Even before the Right-to-Know provision was included
in the 1972 Montana Constitution, it was a matter of public policy and stat-
utory law in Montana that "noncurrent records of permanent value to state
and local governments should be preserved and protected ... and to the end
that the people may receive maximum benefit from the knowledge of state
and local government affairs, the state and local governments should pre-
serve noncurrent records of permanent value for study and research."
'"12
V. IMPROVEMENTS AND BARRIERS TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ACCESS
IN MONTANA
Admittedly, the limited access to Montana legislative history is proba-
bly not a reaction to the Montana Supreme Court's limited use of legislative
history. It is more probable that the barriers to access, all of which are
format-driven, are the result of the allocation of limited resources.
The most important Montana legislative history documents, the min-
utes of committee hearings, have been published in various formats over
time including print, electronic format on CD, as "pdf' documents available
online, and audio format online. Currently, one can access committee hear-
ing minutes only in audio format online. 13 Confusing access even more,
for the 1999 and 2001 legislative sessions, the House transcribed only sum-
mary minutes that provided very brief summaries of committee actions and
time references to the audio recordings.
The Montana Historical Society archives legislative history in all for-
mats, and both the Historical Society and the State Law Library of Montana
provide excellent reference service that photocopies documents. In addi-
tion, print documents are available on publicly accessible microfiche from
1987 to 1995 at the University of Montana School of Law Library, allowing
the researcher to browse the documents to some degree. These combined
services allow the researcher to access and print legislative history docu-
ments at a low cost.
Unfortunately, access becomes more problematic as the legislature
moves toward publishing legislative history in electronic formats. Consider
the history recorded on the 1997 Legislative CD. At this point, the software
needed to run the CD is obsolete, making it difficult to access the materials.
Again, both the Montana Historical Society and the State Law Library of
Montana will copy and send the materials, but the researcher must know
exactly what he or she wants to make a request. The serendipitous aspect of
112. Mont. Code Ann. § 22-3-201.
113. For access to minutes and audio files, go to http://leg.mt.gov/css/.
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research is all but lost. In addition, to "examine" the 1999 and 2001 House
hearings, researchers must request audio tapes from the Montana State His-
torical Society and listen to or transcribe the hearings, a development that
reappeared and seems to have been made permanent beginning with the
2005 legislative session.
The current trend toward online publication of legislative materials
provides immediate access beginning with the 1999 legislative session.
With online access, however, the format of the documents becomes a poten-
tial problem. Until the 2005 session, committees posted electronic word
processing or pdf files of the committee minutes. Access that required the
researcher to have specific software was problematic but posting in pdf for-
mat has solved that problem. However, in 2005, some committees elected
to no longer transcribe the minutes and instead provide access to the audio
files only. This significantly decreased access to those hearings because
researchers again must have the appropriate proprietary software. The
problem was compounded in 2007 when all hearings were posted online in
audio format only. Anecdotal evidence reveals that researchers are unlikely
to listen to and transcribe the audio files, so for practical purposes, access
has been limited, not made easier, by this move to audio only.
114
Another concern is that it is unclear whether there is a retention policy
requiring the Historical Society to maintain legislative records in an archi-
val format, particularly when they arrive at the Historical Society only in
non-archival formats. In archival practice, print and microforms are tradi-
tional archival formats with well-established preservation standards, but
standards are still being developed for archival preservation of electronic
formats.1 5 Scholars are beginning to address this issue as the trend in aca-
demic publishing moves toward publishing in electronic formats so that
scholarship is quickly and easily available on the Internet.1 16 Internet publi-
cation certainly broadens the discourse, but there remain questions as to
how that discourse will be preserved.' 17 Without long-term future access,
scholars will not be able to learn from or build on the work of other schol-
ars. The Montana Legislature faces the same consideration. The availabil-
ity of legislative hearings on the Internet allows the public greater access to
114. The question I am asked most as a reference librarian is for assistance compiling a legislative
history. Montana attorneys seem to be diligent in discovering legislative intent (and presumably then,
citing that intent to the Court). Almost everybody is willing to search for and print records on micro-
fiche even though that can be a tedious and time consuming process. Ol the other hand, very few are
willing to listen to and transcribe the audio files.
115. See e.g. National Archives, Toolkit for Managing Electronic Records, http://toolkit.archives.
gov/pls/htmldb/f?p= 102:1:5818791015763374966 (visited Sept. 22, 2008).
116. Richard A. Danner, Issues in the Preservation of Born-Digital Scholarly Communications in
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relatively recent and almost real-time legislative information. This provides
Montanans more timely access to the legislature, which in turn enhances the
public's constitutional rights to know and to participate.11 Courts, how-
ever, do not always need recent legislative histories; often, in fact, what
they need most are the older documents. This is certainly true when what
they seek is the underlying social history. The Montana Legislature and
Montana Historical Society must ensure not only that legislative informa-
tion is available in usable formats now, but also that it is available in the
more distant future.
The goal of preserving legislative history in usable formats can be ac-
complished through a formal records-access-and-retention policy. The pol-
icy must address both archival preservation and current issues of format
accessibility. If records are archived in electronic format, there must be
some way to ensure future access even as technology changes and formats
become obsolete. The 1997 Legislative CD is an example of access hin-
dered by an obsolete format. Fortunately, at this point, there is current tech-
nology that has allowed translation of the data into a more stable and acces-
sible format.1 19 Unfortunately, it is unclear whether these records are also
stored in an archival format.
Audio formats are even more problematic. Both current access and
archival preservation are significant issues. Virtually no technology is re-
quired to access print formats. This is not true of audio formats, all of
which require some form of technology to access. The hearings of the past
two legislative sessions, and presumably the upcoming 2009 session, that
are accessible only in audio format online require not only computer and
Internet access, but also proprietary online audio players. Such technology-
dependent access is not universal. At this point, if there are no written
transcripts of the hearings, some researchers have no practical means of
access. Preservation of audio formats is a larger issue that must take into
account the preservation of electronic files and also the preservation of
technology that enables access to those files in the future. A discussion of
the technical standards and requirements for preserving audio files is well
beyond the scope of this article, but must be included in a records retention
policy.
The Montana Legislature is to be commended for using technology to
increase real-time and current access to legislative records. Even though
there are some format issues related to access, Montanans have a great deal
more access to current legislative proceedings than in the past. In fact, the
Legislative Council has approved additional funding to provide audio feeds
118. Mont. Const. art. II, §§ 8, 9.
119. Bob Peck at the William J. Jameson Library at The University of Montana School of Law has
translated the documents on the CD from the Folio database into a more stable searchable pdf file.
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in the Senate and committee hearing rooms during the 2009 legislative ses-
sion. 120 It is unclear, however, whether the audio will be recorded or acces-
sible in the future. When the Montana Supreme Court decides at some time
in the future that it is appropriate to turn to legislative history to interpret a
statute enacted in 1997 or 2007, will that legislative history still exist?
VI. CONCLUSION
The appropriate use of legislative history to interpret statutes is far
from settled. Courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court and the Montana
Supreme Court, limit the use of legislative history but do not seem to hesi-
tate to use it when their jurisprudence deems the use appropriate. Cur-
rently, and relatively consistently, the Montana Supreme Court espouses a
more liberal rule regarding the use of legislative history and is more likely
than the U.S. Supreme Court to turn to legislative history to resolve statu-
tory ambiguities.
The reality is that legislative history has a variety of uses, and however
it is used, is a necessary and important social and legal record to which
legislatures must ensure continuous, comprehensive access. The Montana
Constitution's fundamental Right-to-Know provision mandates access to
the legislative record regardless of how Montana courts utilize that record.
While the Montana Legislative Services has taken a huge step forward
in using technology to provide access to recent records, that very same tech-
nology may hinder future access, leaving citizens and courts without a vital
record.
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